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Youth Radicalization: Somali identity and support for 
Al-Shabaab in the U.K., the U.S., and Canada 
Funded by the International Development Research Centre 
Like many other young Westerners, Mohamed Elmi Ibrahim was attending university, 
majoring in English.i He maintained a blog where he posted pictures of pilgrimages to 
Mecca; unsurprising for a young Muslim publicly displaying his faith. Ibrahim’s blog also 
contained pictures of snow-filled landscapes featuring the northern lights; also unsurprising 
for a young Canadian.ii  In 2009, however, he diverged from the usual path of a second-
generation Somali living in Canada, and disappeared. He was not alone. That same year, five 
other young Canadians of Somali decent went missing.iii It was feared that Ibrahim –and the 
five others– were lured into joining al-Shabaab (Arabic for “The Youth”), a terrorist group 
that is not only engaged in a local fight against the Somali government, but that has also 
aligned itself with al Qaeda to fight to the global jihad.iv In March 2010, a video posted on the 
Internet not only confirmed that Ibrahim had indeed joined the ranks of al-Shabaab, but 
posted his eulogy: Ibrahim had died in combat.   
 
Unfortunately, other young Somalis living in the West have been the subjects of 
similar fates. Most notable was Shirwa Ahmed who left Minneapolis to join al-Shabaab. In 
2008, he drove a bomb-laden vehicle that exploded in northern Somalia, infamously 
becoming the first American suicide bomber.v At the time of writing this report, 
approximately 40 American-Somalis are thought to have participated in al-Shabaab’s 
insurgency, whereas in Canada, the estimates are closer to 20 Canadian-Somalis.vi Somali 
jihadists of Western citizenship do not only stem from North America. Somali youth living in 
Britain are also alleged to have joined Al Shabaabvii, while young Somalis have also been 























































For these reasons, the lure of Al Shabaab has become a major concern for Western 
countries. During the summer of 2011, the American congress organized a series of hearings 
on the radicalization of Muslim-Americans. The third hearing, held on July 27th, focused on al-
Shabaab and its links to al-Qaeda, its partnerships with al-Qaeda’s affiliates, as well as its 
success in recruiting Western citizens. In describing the threat that represents al-Shabaab, 
the hearings’ chairman Peter T. King claimed: “Not al-Qaeda, nor any of its other affiliates, 
have come close to drawing so many Muslim-Americans and Westerners to jihad.” Although 
the threat is clear, precisely why youth from the Somali diasporas leave their countries to 
join al-Shabaab remains poorly understood.  
 
A response by the Canadian Friends of Somalia:  
It is in this context that the Canadian Friends of Somalia (CFS), a non-profit 
organization serving the Somali community of Canada, has made it its mission to better 
understand how Somali youth become involved with al-Shabaab. Through a better 
understanding of the factors motivating youth to join an extremist group, the CFS is seeking 
to be better equipped to detract them from this self-destructive endeavor. To fulfill this 
goal, CFS conducted an international survey to identify factors related to the radicalization 
of Somali youth living in Western countries.  
 
To be clear, The CFS is not a research institution; it is a community-based organization 
that provides social services to the Somali diaspora. This research, however, is aligned with 
CFS’s mandate of community service. As many people in the Somali community –as well as 
outside– have increasingly expressed worry about Somali youth, CFS’ executive committee 
has deliberated about various initiatives to address this worry. Research aimed at 
understanding youth involvement with al-Shabaab emerged as the most valuable first step. 
Recognizing that research is beyond its normal range of activities, the CFS enlisted the 
assistance of Michael King, who is trained in social psychology, studies radicalization, and is 
well-versed in community-based research methodology. Together, CFS and King have 






















In the next section of this report, the first phase of the research is described, which 
entailed building a theory of youth radicalization. Following this is a summary of the data-
collection phase of the research, during which a survey was conducted with Somali youth 
across three Western countries. Thereafter, an analysis of the data is presented with the 
goal of determining if the survey results support our theory of youth radicalization. The final 
section of the present report offers several recommendations based on the research 
findings.  
 
Understanding Youth Radicalization: 
Much has been written about the radicalization of young Muslims in Western 
countries who become involved in violent jihad. Within this vast literature, security experts 
and social scientists have offered many theories about how this occurs.x To effectively 
review the current state of knowledge about radicalization, CFS organized an international 
conference convening security experts, policy makers, law enforcement officials, academics, 
and community leaders. Most notably was the additional presence of Somali diaspora 
members from the UK, Sweden, Holland, USA, and Canada. This conference was held in 
Ottawa, December 6-7 2010, under the banner Promoting Peace and Preventing Youth 
Radicalization, with the expressed goal of understanding why Somali youth in Western 
countries join al-Shabaab. 
 
Conference: Convening Expertise:  
From the various presentations and discussions held during the conference, a theory 
of radicalization emerged. Experts, academics, law enforcement officials, and Somali youth 
themselves commonly pointed to the mismanagement of the dual-identity held by 2nd 
generation immigrants as a central factor to youth radicalization. Somali youth living in the 
West must manage a heritage identity inherited from their family at the same time as they 
wrestle with internalizing some form of identity conferred by their country of residence.xi 






















































adolescence, managing these two identities can be especially difficult.xii These challenges –
many conference attendees claimed– can somehow lead youth to explore and eventually 
embrace violent jihad.  
 
It is important to highlight that the centrality of identity to youth radicalization 
emerged as a theory. That is, this notion was rooted in the educated supposition of 
academics, the professional insights of security officials, and the personal experiences of 
Somali diaspora members. No empirical evidence was presented at the conference to 
support this notion. Nevertheless, in having so many experts –as well as youth themselves– 
describing similar identity-related processes leading to radicalization, CFS had obtained a 
clear focal point to begin its research project. 
 
The conference attendees’ focus on identity accurately reflected the growing 
consensus among many terrorism researchers about identity as having a role in the 
radicalization process leading to violence.xiii To be clear, researchers are not referring to 
personal identities, but rather group-level identities, such as those based on occupation, 
gender, ethnicity, geography, and of course, religion. When individuals consider themselves 
as part of a social category, in other words they identify with a group, this identity becomes 
psychologically important, and can be the basis for various behaviours.xiv  
 
After the Promoting Peace and Preventing Youth Radicalization conference, CFS and 
its academic collaborator Michael King further developed a theory of youth radicalization. 
This theory was to remain anchored in the experiences of conference attendees, yet also 
aligned with established academic research from social psychology and terrorism studies. 
Moreover, this theory had to be testable using a survey methodology. This resulted in an 
























An Identity-Centered Theory of Youth Radicalization:  
Three factors are thought to increase the likelihood for Somali youth in a Western 
country to radicalize and ultimately join al-Shabaab. First is the failure to successfully 
internalize their bicultural identity by rejecting Western identity. Second is a heightened 
interest in Islam, which can sometimes lead one to explore jihadi ideology. The third factor is 
the appeal of jihadism, which emphasizes bravado, adventure, and the glorification of 
violence.  
 
Independently, each of these factors is insufficient to raise the likelihood of 
radicalization. For example, an increased interest in Islam can lead to positive personal and 
social outcomes when unaccompanied by the two other factors. We contend, however, that 
under the circumstances where an individual rejects Western culture (factor 1) and finds 
jihadism personally appealing (factor 3), an increased interest in Islam (factor 2) raises the 
likelihood for radicalization to occur. A detailed explanation of each factor is offered next.  
 
Factor 1:  Bicultural identity integration fai lure & rejecting Western 
identity:  
Somali youth living in Canada, like many others, must integrate two collective 
identities. Immigrants, the children of immigrants, First Nations, and children of bi-cultural 
parents, all must psychologically integrate a heritage culture with its corresponding identity, 
along with a mainstream Canadian culture and its corresponding identity.  
 
Much research has been devoted to understanding the adaptation of those faced 
with integrating the identities arising from two different cultures. As a whole, findings 
suggest that bicultural youth do learn to comfortably navigate their two cultures, and 
generally adopt aspects of both identities. An individual can thus feel both Somali and 
Canadian, without having to favor one identity over the other.xv Although conflicts may 
sometimes arise from living in two different cultures, bicultural individuals tend to be 






















































understanding ones’ bicultural identity has been linked to increased self-esteem and well-
being.
xviii
xvii More pertinent to this research, however, is the claim made by some experts that 
developing a dual-identity, or at least internalizing aspects of North-American cultural 
values, may inoculate bicultural individuals against radicalization.   
 
Unfortunately, some individuals do not effectively internalize their two cultural 
identities. There exists a multitude of reasons for this to happen. For simplicity, however, 
barriers to identity integration can be categorized along two dimensions.xix First are barriers 
that are external to the individual; these mostly concern the acceptance of others. For 
example, research has illustrated how despite feeling just as American as their peers, Asian-
Americans report being perceived as less American than their mainstream peers, and being 
treated as foreigners in daily interactions.xx In such circumstances, a minority group 
member’s Western identity is “denied” by mainstream others. 
 
Second are barriers that are internal to the individual; these mostly concern 
motivation. Indeed, those who are faced with internalizing two cultures, first and foremost, 
must want to internalize each culture. Here, it is important to distinguish between those 
who might apathetically lack motivation to acculturate from those who actively seek to 
reject a specific culture. According to our theory, it is the active rejection that constitutes 
the first step in the radicalization process. 
 
To be clear, Somali-Canadian youth are faced with a psychological task they have 
little control over: they must integrate two cultures as part of their identity. By living in 
Canada, they are subjected to Canadian culture and bestowed a Canadian identity. They also 
possess Somali heritage, an undeniable feature that differentiates them from mainstream 
Canadians. Many –if not most– comfortably internalize this dual identity. In some cases 






















The rejection of Western mainstream culture can be expressed in a variety of ways, 
from art and activism to criminality and violence.xxi How youth choose to express this 
rejection may largely depend on the framework they find to structure what many describe 
as a vague, simplistic, and often naïve hostility towards mainstream culture. The danger is 
that among other ideologies, jihadism is readily available, and it offers validation, coherence 
and structure for their negative attitudes regarding the West. To become interested in 
jihadism, however, two other psychological factors must also be present in the individual. 
One of these factors is an interest in Islam, which we describe next.  
 
Factor 2: Heightened interest in Islam: 
By itself, the rejection of Western culture cannot account for youth radicalization. 
Among the bicultural youth who do reject the Western dimension of their identity, the vast 
majority do not radicalize towards jihadism. To begin exploring jiahdism, we contend that 
those who reject Western culture must also experience a heightened interest in Islam.  
For some Muslims living in Western countries, this heightened interest has been 
instigated by the attacks of September 11 2001 and the ensuing public debate about Islam.
xxiii
xxii 
Research in the US and the UK describe how many Muslims asserted their religious identity 
in reaction to negative media coverage of Islam and the discrimination that followed 9/11.  
Alongside the negative attention brought upon Muslims, 9/11 also aroused a genuine 
curiosity about Islam by people of all faiths. This widespread public curiosity has seemingly 
led many young Canadian Muslims to learn more about Islam.xxiv 
 
It is through their attempts to learn about Islam that some youth may out of curiosity 
explore jihadism. Lectures, books, essays, and even magazines advocating jihadi ideology 
are easily found, and the Internet allows for easy access to a vast array of informative and 
visually compelling sources for interested youth. For those becoming acquainted with its 
tenets, jihadism may be appealing as it offers a coherent framework for understanding their 























































Among those who resonate to jihadism’s anti-Western doctrine, many will find its 
extremity and rigidity unpalatable. Some, however, will not, and venture to learn more. 
These individuals are on the cusp of beginning the radicalization process. At this point, we 
contend that a major factor that ultimately leads youth to radicalize is the sub-culture 
surrounding jihadism. The features rendering this sub-culture attractive are discussed next. 
 
Factor 3: The lure of jihadi culture: 
The final factor in our theory of radicalization is personal resonance with jihadi sub-
culture. Youth, especially young men, might be motivated to explore the ideology because 
of its accompanying lifestyle, which involves secrecy, adventure, danger, and heroism. 
Although violence is generally considered to be morally wrong, the violence perpetrated by 
jihadists is framed in righteousness, piety, and the fight against injustice. Terrorist observer 
Jessica Stern claims that for some young Muslims in the West, “jihad is a cool way of 
expressing dissatisfaction with power elite”.
xxvii
xxv Experts have echoed this observation by 
suggesting that sensation seeking underlies the motivations of many individuals charged 
with homegrown terrorism.xxvi One such expert, Marc Sageman, states that: “Global Islamist 
terrorists see themselves as warriors in pursuit of fame and glory”.  
 
It is thus not a surprise to find al-Shabaab exploiting the allure of the jihadi sub-
culture in its recruitment efforts. Omar Hammami, an American Muslim who has joined and 
risen through the ranks of al-Shabaab, has produced half-a-dozen English rap songs since 
2009 aimed at attracting young Western Muslims to join the global jihad.xxviii His rhymes 
focus on themes of bravado, self-sacrifice, and injustice, often interspersed with the names 
of high-tech weapons used by Western armies. 
 
The identity-centered theory of youth radicalization thus consists of three 
independent factors that, when combined, increase the likelihood that a Somali youth living 





















available to conduct jihad, supporting and ultimately joining al-Shabaab may appear as the 
most obvious avenue for Somali youth.  
 
Testing the theory: 
To test its identity-centered theory of youth radicalization, CFS designed a survey 
that was completed by Somali youth living in the U.K., the U.S., and Canada. In line with 
being the organization’s first research project, CFS kept the survey simple and short, 
focusing only on testing the theory’s two initial factors. The first factor, bicultural identity 
integration failure & rejecting Western identity, was assessed by asking youth about their 
Somali, 
 Muslim, and Western identities. The theory’s second factor, the heightened interest 
in Islam, was assessed by asking youth about their level of religiosity since September 11, 
2001. The survey also included questions to determine youth’s attitudes towards al-Shabaab, 
which was used as a simplistic proxy indicator of “radicalization”.   
 
If the survey findings were to support the identity-centered theory of youth 
radicalization, a pattern of results would emerge. Specifically, youth who excluded the 
Western identity from their identity (factor 1) and reported an increase in religiosity since 





Several strategies were undertaken to recruit Somali youth for this research project. 
The CFS contacted various Somali youth organizations located in the US, Canada, and the UK 
to help advertise its survey. Each organization hosted Somali youth in a classroom setting to 























































The survey was also made available on the Internet. The CFS used various social-
media platforms to advertise the survey, such as Facebook, Linked-In, and Twitter. An 
internet-link was also posted on the CFS website which redirected youth to the online 
survey. The CFS also sent emails to various members of the diaspora announcing the survey 
and inviting youth to participate. Moreover, the survey was advertised on websites often 
visited by Somali youth, such as hiiraan.com, somalinet.com & somaliaonline.com 
Participation was restricted to residents of the United States, Canada, and Britain, between 
the ages of 16 to 25 that identified as Somali.   
  
Respondents: 
In total, 357 youth completed the online survey, of these, 105 were completed by 
women and 252 by men, with approximately half (53.5%) of the sample between the ages of 
23 and 25. The largest portion (161 or 45.1%) was from the United States, while 121 (or 33.9%) 
were from Canada, and 75 (or 21%) from Britain. The majority of respondents (204 or 57.1%) 
were university students, while 83 (23.2%) were in high school; others either had full-time or 
part-time employment, or were in search of work.  
 
Survey:  
The online survey, and its corresponding printed version, could be divided into three 
broad sections. The first section contained demographic questions about age, gender, 
occupation, and country of residence. 
 
The second section contained a question assessing youth’s perception of their 
collective identity. Here, respondents were asked to specify which categories –among four– 
best described their identity. Respondents could choos0e Somali or Muslim, or an identity 
representing their Western country of residence, such as American, Canadian, or British. 
They could also select a category that represented a dual-identity, combining their Somali 
identity with that of their Western country of residence. Respondents could also choose 






















The third section contained questions about religiosity and al-Shabaab. One question 
assessed respondents increased religiosity after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Here, 
respondents could answer from 1 (not at all) to 4 (definitely). The last question in this 
section asked if al-Shabaab fighters were fighting a “just cause”. To answer, respondents 
could choose from a 3-point scale ranging from “no”, “not sure”, to “yes”.  
 
A concluding section thanked respondents for completing the survey, and contained 
CFS’ coordinates inviting questions or comments about the research. 
 
Survey Results:  
A statistical breakdown of respondents’ answers is presented next. Here, it is 
important to note that although 357 youth participated, each respondent did not answer all 
questions on the survey. Consequently, the following statistics are based on smaller sample 
sizes. 
Table 1 displays how Somali youth, across the three Western countries, categorized 
their own identity. For each country, the most popular identity category is indicated in bold. 
The statistics in Table 1 indicate that youth living in the United States and Canada were more 
likely to categorize themselves as bicultural, whereas youth living in the U.K. were more 
likely to consider themselves as Somali only. These results suggest important attitudinal 
differences about the West between Somali youth in North America and those in Britain.  
 
Table 1. Identity categorization of Somali youth 
 U.S.  (N=112) Canada  (N=100) U.K.  (N=53) 
Only Somali 35.7 % 23.0 % 39.6 % 
Only Muslim 8.9 % 16.0 % 13.2 % 
Somali-Muslim 14.3 % 6.0 % 26.4 % 
Only Western 0.9 % 7.0 % 1.9 % 























































Table 2 displays youth’s increase of religiosity following 9/11 across the three 
countries. Canadian- and British-Somali youth report, on average, having slightly greater 
increases of religiosity following 9/11 as compared to American youth. The same table also 
contains respondents’ support for al-Shabaab. Youth in all three countries uniformly 
indicated little support for al-Shabaab. 
 
Table 2. Increased religiosity following 9/11 and support for al-Shabaab 
 U.S. Canada U.K. 
Increased religiosity    
Mean (on 4-point scale) 1.89 2.22 2.15 
Standard deviation 1.07 1.16 1.17 
N 116 94 54 
Support for al-Shabaab    
Mean (on 3-point scale) 1.48 1.58 1.56 
Standard deviation 0.56 0.74 0.72 
N 100 76 45 
 
Table 3 contains the statistical relationship between respondents’ self-reported 
increased religiosity after 9/11, and their level of support for al-Shabaab. Here, when youth in 
the U.S. and the U.K. report an increase in religiosity after 9/11, they also tend to report 
increased support for al-Shabaab. This statistical relationship is strongest for British-Somali 
youth, but does not occur for Somali-Canadian youth.  
Table 3. Correlations between Post 9/11 increased religiosity and Support for Shabaab. 
 U.S. Canada U.K. 
Correlation (r) .30** .17 .49*** 
N 93 69 41 





















Overall, this pattern of results yields preliminary support for our identity-centered 
theory of youth radicalization. Based on the presentations and discussions from the 
Promoting Peace and Preventing Youth Radicalization conference, as well as established 
academic research from social psychology and terrorism studies, we suggested that three 
psychological factors might be involved in the radicalization process. First is the rejection of 
one’s Western identity, which prevents youth from internalizing their bicultural identity. 
Second is a heightened interest in Islam. The third factor is the appeal of jihadi sub-culture. 
The survey results substantiate the first and second factor. When compared to youth in 
America and Canada, Somali youth in the U.K. were more likely to exclude the Western 
identity when asked to categorize themselves.  Moreover, youth in the U.K. were more likely 
to support al-Shabaab if their religiosity increased after 9/11. 
 
Thus, the claim made by many that “identity” is somehow involved in youth 
radicalization does seem founded, and future research is warranted.  
 
Recommendations: 
1.  Although this research has yielded preliminary support for our identity-
centered theory of youth radicalization, it is recommended that further research be 
conducted. Here, the most pressing objective for future research should be to validate the 
findings of the present report by conducting additional, more extensive research with 
Somali youth. Additional dimensions of youth’s bicultural identity should be explored, and 
the allure of jihadi sub-culture should be investigated. Future research might consider 
obtaining larger samples from more Western countries, while also including other youth for 
comparison. Should the identity-centered theory of youth radicalization find additional 
support, CFS and other community-based organizations will be better equipped to intervene 

























































2. In order to increase our understanding of potential preventative measures 
regarding our identity-centered theory of youth radicalization among Somali Youth, it is 
recommended to establish innovative community based programs for Somali youth in the 
Western Diaspora. These programs should involve youth in all aspects from the programs 
development to its implementation.  A community based dialogue centered on the issue of 
bicultural identity should be explored, and an open and frank discussion around jihadi sub-
culture and Al Shabaab within the community should be established.    These programs 
should include; cross-cultural and diversity training, youth engagement and leadership 
initiatives, parenting skills and inter-generational conflict, promoting inter-faith dialogue and 
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